The Cuban Missile Crisis The Cold War KS3 History homework help for year 7, 8 and 9 BBC Bitesize

Leading Soviet figures failed to mention that only the Cuban government could agree to inspections of the territory, and continued to make arrangements relating to Cuba without Castro’s knowledge. Kennedy had no intention of keeping these plans secret, and with an array of Cuban and Soviet spies present Khrushchev was made aware of them. The Soviets had shown no indication that they would back down and had made public media and private inter-government statements to that effect. He was persuaded to wait and continue with military and diplomatic pressure.

They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. On 15 October 1962, the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that appeared to be medium range ballistic missiles. After the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960, it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force aircraft apparently being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to explain than a CIA flight. In September 1962, analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect ICBM bases, and the DIA lobbied for resumption of U-2 flights over the island.

Game – Khrushchev

• In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of SACEUR, which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union.
• They had support from the CIA but the US government did not send US troops to support the invasion.
• Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full conflict despite pressures from their respective governments.
• The blockade was formally ended on 20 November after all offensive missiles and bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba.
• In 1983, Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov trusted his intuition and called a warning of an incoming missile a false alarm.

Over the course of the crisis, Kennedy had daily telephone conversations with Macmillan, who was publicly supportive of US actions. In Moscow, US Ambassador Foy D. Kohler briefed Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy’s speech to the nation. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the “quarantine” operation.

President Kennedy’s decision

On 24 October, Kislovodsk, a Soviet cargo ship, reported a position north-east of where it had been 24 hours earlier, indicating it had “discontinued” its voyage and turned back towards the Baltic. That took place the next day, and Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked. By 22 October, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one-hour alert status. They did not increase their alert; they did not increase any flights, or their air defense posture. Jack J. Catton later estimated that about 80 per cent of SAC’s planes were ready for launch during the crisis.

With the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War, the US government sought to promote private enterprise as an instrument for advancing US strategic interests in the developing world. It determined that the US government’s demands, part of their hostile reaction to Cuban government policy, were unacceptable. The Cuban government regarded US imperialism as the primary explanation for the island’s structural weaknesses.

On 28 October 1962, Khrushchev told his son Sergei that the shooting down of Anderson’s U-2 was by the “Cuban military at the direction of Raúl Castro”. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei, general manager of RAI-TV, to convey to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. It also noted that the Cuban military continued to organise for action but was under order not to act unless attacked.citation needed

The US had a considerable advantage in total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the technology required for accurate delivery. The Soviet Union had medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700, but they were unreliable and inaccurate. The Soviet First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, increased the perception of a ‘missile gap’ when he boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles “like sausages”, but Soviet missile numbers and capabilities were nowhere close to his assertions. It also had eight George Washington- and Ethan Allen-class ballistic missile submarines, with the capability to launch 16 Polaris missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km).

In the fall of 1962, the Soviet Union began construction on ballistic missile launch sites in Cuba. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique forms. It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message. That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. The peaceful resolution of the crisis with the Soviets is considered to be one of Kennedy’s greatest achievements. The standoff nearly caused a nuclear exchange and is remembered in this country as the Cuban Missile Crisis.